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Abstract 
Private use of public office for private gain could be a tentative connotation of corruption and most 
distasteful event of corruption is that it is not there, nor that it is pervasive, but it is socially acknowledged 
in the global economy, especially in the developing nations. In the present paper we attempt to assess the 
interrelationship between the Corruption perception index (CPI) and the principal components of 
governance indicators as per World Bank Governance Indicators like Control of Corruption (CC), Rule of 
Law (RL), Regulatory Quality (RQ) and Government Effectiveness (GE). Applying Granger Causality Test 
the study observes a mixed or inconclusive result. Only bilateral causal link between the CPI and CC 
works for UK, whereas there are unilateral causal links between the CPI and one or more governance 
indicators working for other countries for France, Japan, China, India, Thailand and South Africa. In no 
way causalities are observed for USA, Germany and Brazil. 
Key Words: CPI, Governance indicators, Granger Causality, Correlation, Regression  
JEL classification: G21, G 32
Introduction 
Private use of public office for rent seeking could be a tentative definition of corruption and most distasteful event of 
corruption is that it is not there, nor that it is pervasive, but it is socially acknowledged in the global economy, 
especially in the developing nations. It is not a newly emerged social crisis because it already remained since long 
back as mentioned by Kautilya in his Arthasastra, 2000 years back. But its anatomy and morphology have changed 
over the years because of the applications new technologies and resurgence of counter software, and gradually it has 
been linked to the market that directly affects nation’s growth and development. Today’s ongoing worldwide debate 
on the burden of social cost of corruptions at micro and macro level prioritized in the forefront so far as growth and 
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development are concerned. It matters much to both domestic and foreign investors so far as a large number of 
government clearances at the cost of sizeable bribes are concerned. Foreign investors from developed nations often 
face tremendous difficulty to adjust them as degree of corruption is relatively high due to lax governance. Countries 
experiencing chronic poverty seem to be natural breeding center points for systematic corruption. Corruption might 
not directly cause poverty; rather corruption has direct consequences on economic and governance factors, 
intermediaries that in turn produce poverty. A common man has to participate in the corruption-oriented activities 
because there is no other option if he has to get a driving license or a registered deed of his housing property or 
permission from a public sector office. Politicians do not leave the chance in doing business and they often raise voice 
to raise the fund in such public scheme, the tragedy of common property to speak of. Administrative system, 
legislative, judiciary system and part of the media in democratic country are not found responsive or rather ineffective 
in order to curb even a small profile of corruption since public servants in these institutions are the beneficiaries of 
corruption – a trade off.    
We might think today’s ever growing volume of corruption in terms of supply and demand for corruption. The supply 
of corruption is supposed to be directly proportional to the volume of government-oriented services/activities and it is 
inversely related to the volume of market-oriented transactions. Public servants are assumed to be the sources of 
corruption as they often sell their unethical services for their personal gain. The excessive legal protections provided 
to the public servants are not deniable so far as rising trend of corruption is concerned, for an example, Official 
Secrets Act (1923) in India. To reduce the supply of corruption the removal of protection of law in favor of corrupt 
government officials is the only option today. Another component of supply of corruption is the budget provision 
required to cover election costs when the backdated system of election generates corruption or state-funding to 
political party causes fiscal deficit. Collection of fund by the political parties during the election, under democratic set 
up, from the corporate sectors or power brokers is another component of supply of corruption because high dividend 
has to be paid back to the stakeholders after victory of election. The dividend takes the form of unethical issuance of 
licenses, registration, and high cost project at unsuitable place which obviously cause inflation due to inefficient 
project; it raises the volume of subsidy too. It can be explained by corruption led unbearable social cost to the citizens. 
Another element of supply of corruption is the costs of advertisement in television and newspaper during the election 
process; an illegal trade-off between part of the media and some of the political parties is a common practice today. It 
is added that government abstains from releasing market-sensitive decisions or information which reduces market 
incentive for private investors and hence investment potentiality sound bad.  
No doubt, demand for corruption is derived by the degree of need for having public services or services provided by 
the government and it is true that volume of peoples’ demand for public services is directly proportional to the size of 
the government. So demand for corruption is likely to be reduced in a country with small government as competitions 
in the big market do not provide any space for bribes. So demand for corruption is expected to be reduced as 
proportion of market-determined activities/services to the government-sponsored activities is enhanced that never be 
allowed in the world of developing nations. In the present context, the “retail component” of demand for corruption is 
inevitably generated as common people require various kinds of permission, licenses in their daily life. Paul (1997) 
suggested that every fourth person in one of the large cities in India pays bribes when dealing with the agencies such 
as municipal services, urban development and electricity. The “wholesale component” of demand for corruption is 
generated by the corporate sectors as they often take advantage of a restrictive practice or price control during 
issuance of industrial license in control-era too. In some cases, prices at each stage of transactions from factory to 
retail points are prescribed by the government which generates massive corruption despite the economic reforms in 
several countries. Government control matters much in the fields of import and foreign exchange transactions. The 
wholesale demand for corruption has been perhaps reduced after liberalization, but it is not yet eliminated. It is to be 
added that, in order set up even a medium-sized industrial factory, clearances from governments are essentially 
required and hence it would obviously be demand-enhancing factor. Industrialists often buy unethical services from 
the government servants to accelerate the process of manufacturing desired products (or disproportionate profit share). 
Radical institutional reforms along with the reduction of volume of the government-activities, as far as possible, may 
be the way to get reduced volume of supply and demand for corruption. 
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Literature Review   
A substantial number of recent studies have examined the relationship between corruption and other macroeconomic 
or non-economic factors. According to Chetwynd, Chetwynd and Spector (2003), corruption affects poverty by first 
impacting growth factors, which, in turn, impact poverty levels. The empirical works backed by theoretical framework 
explain that there is a direct causal link between corruption and economic growth. Corruption factor works as 
disincentive to FDI, lowering the quality of public infrastructure, decreasing tax revenue, distorting the composition of 
public infrastructure. Positive association between corruption and income inequality is established empirically. It is 
also observed in their literature that lower income households (and businesses) pay a higher proportion of their 
income in bribes than do middle or upper-income households. Studies show that the absence of economic growth (or 
negative growth) increases poverty. It is convincingly established that corruption influences governance or it weakens 
capacity of governance which, in turn, weakens political institutions.  According to Mauro (1955), in a country where 
corruption is widespread, a reduction of corruption by, say, 50 percent, can increase growth rate by about 1.5 
percentage points. Adeb and Gupta (2002) opined that investment choices are driven by their potential for corruption 
and illicit gains rather than their contribution to national output or the real rate of return on projects. Friedman, E., 
Johnson, S., Kaufmann, D., Zoido-Lobaton, P (2000) empirically established that countries with high level of 
corruption tend to have lower collection of tax revenues to their national incomes. The findings of European Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development (1999) explore that corruption and anti-competitive practices are the most difficult 
obstacles to the firms for starting business which were found in a survey of 3000 enterprises across twenty transition 
economies. Investigation of Guhan and Paul (1997) reveals that vertical integration of corruption at various levels of 
the government hierarchy is discernable where elected politicians, higher and lower bureaucracy participate. James 
(2003) investigated that different rankings of competitiveness or business environment incorporate measures of 
corruption / governance like Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index constructed by World 
Economic Forum, Transparency International. It focuses factors linked to transparency of the legal/regulatory quality, 
and how opacity index incorporates poor governance and corruption. The empirical results show that poor governance 
imposes  an increasing burden of uncertainty to the businessmen, construing high unit cost of production, increasing 
direct cost of bribery, distortion of  the types of activities persuaded by private sector which depress private activity, 
and hence income, employment and growth. Kauffman et al. (1999) suggested that good governance is supplementary 
to the market-enhancing conditions.  
Today corruption is acknowledged to be a key factor in preventing development in large areas of the world and hence 
a series of projects and tools have been developed to effectively fight against, but it is a difficult framework to assess. 
Corruption is inherently a difficult reality to measure, where information is scarce and objective data are not usually 
available. Initial effort is to build corruption-governance-measurement systems were rather fragmentary and 
inconsistent until 1990s, with lack of reliable and contrastable data. Kaufmann, D. A. Kraay and M.Mastruzzi (2006) 
opined that corruption assessment started taking place through three broad ways : 1) gathering selected views of 
stakeholders , including surveys of businesses , public officials, international actors like NGO and multinational 
agencies , individuals. 2) tracking countries’ institutional profiles such as procurement practices, administrative 
practices, budget management, it did not measure corruption but it has proved to be useful indicator 3) through audits 
of projects such as financial audits , spending reports, contrast between expected actual outcomes. 
Corruption indicators are based on “perception” and hence it is called subjective measurement while scarcity of 
objective measurement cannot be denied. The gap between subjective and objective corruption indicators is a source 
of controversy. Absolute objective measurement of corruption is obviously rare event. The subjective indicators may 
include questions such as “Do you think your government is corrupt”? In contrast, objective perception-based 
indicators significantly narrow their questions to the real life. Here Bradburn (1983) suggested attitudinal bias arises 
or personal attitude works in collecting data. Objective measurement models is more accurate like survey responses 
on corruption in four Latin American counters or surveys of business managers on the bribes paid to twenty-one 
Easter European and Central Asian nations of late some scientists like Duncan (2006) have tried to build pure 
objective corruption measurement through innovative tools Golden and Picci (2005) compared spending on public 
works on diverse regions of Italy, finding out that gaps were much higher in Southern Italy. More sophisticated is the 
model developed by Olken (2006) where he studied a particular case of infrastructure (road) corruption in Indonesia 
through the comparison between corruption perception by local individuals and real corruption, measured through 
reported expenditures on building materials, financial audits and final construction of road. 
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Most models of subjective measurement are currently based on polls and surveys. Survey may include perception-
based questions or experienced-based one.  Skeptical studies often confuse – Bangladesh, where very poor corruption 
rankings have co-existed with impressive economic growth. However, empirical studies have extensively proved a 
negative correlation between corruption and economic performance, regardless some exceptions of Rigobon (2004). 
Today research by Acemoglu (2001) has proved that a one standard deviation increase in corruption reduces 
investment rates by three percentage points and lowers annual growth by one percentage point. Another example of 
measurement is the data collected by the Economist Intelligence. Now we discuss about past studies on Aggregate 
Indicators. Beyond subjective and objective indicators, a new generation of corruption and governance indicators 
appeared in the mid 1990s, composite or aggregate indicators is developed by Kaufmann et al (1999), aggregate 
indicators have got some advantage over individual indicators. Kaufmann, D., A. Kraay (2007) identified four main 
benefits from aggregate indicators: 1) it has broader country coverage 2) it provides functional summery from a vast 
array of individual indicators 3) they reduce measurement error as well as the influences of bias of individual sources 
4) calculation of explicit margin of error undertaken. Several indicators are available today; three of them have stood 
out because of its sophistication and very extensive use among anti-corruption practitioners- 1) Corruption Perception 
Index published annually by Transparency International, 2) Business Environment and Enterprise Survey (BEEPS) 
and 3) World Governance Indicators (WGI) since 1996. 
With the progress of time Lambsdroff (2006) postulated that Corruption Perception Index (CPI) is an aggregated 
indicator built by adding a varying set of component measures and CPI is commonly called the “poll of polls” (like 
exit poll). CPI has revealed as a powerful tool and accepted worldwide. It is constructed from the data collected from 
various sources, such as World Economic Forum, the Institute of Management Development, Price Waterhouse 
Coopers,  Freedom House, Gallup International; CPI in the current year also includes the random effects if it is 
happened with respect to previous year. But several criticisms have been raised so far as its inaccuracy, inconsistency 
are concerned.  
Business Environment and Enterprise launched in 1999 and initiative was taken by World Bank after growing 
consensus on the incident of corruption. Data are gathered for the elaboration of World development Report in 1997 
and ongoing World Business Environment Survey, and it is treated as a measure from private-sector view vis a vis 
quality of governance across 20 nations of Eastern Europe and Central Asia. BEEPS was cost-intensive to build which 
is concerned to private firms , and provided new inputs for ant-corruption and public-private partnership projects  of 
Hellman (2000). BEEPS estimate a margin of error for several of its questions and therefore, controlling factor in the 
survey works well. So World Governance Indicators along with CPI and BEEPS are most important indicators used 
today. WGI is not strictly “corruption” indicator because it measures other factors in order to assess governance 
“photo” of every country, but it is relevant to the discussion as one of the dimensions captured by the WGI is the 1) 
control of corruption 2) voice and accountability 3) political stability and absence of violence 4) governance 
effectiveness 5) regulatory quality 6) rule of law. Francisco (2007) has talked about an extensive history since 1996 
when World Bank Institute has produced WGI trough or box containing  more than 30 data sources in 200 countries. 
WGI is the aggregated structure which is based on a statistical methodology known as “unobserved components 
model”. Aggregated indicators are weighted averages; weights represent the precision (exactness) of the individual 
data sources taken under consideration. As in BEEPS, the unobserved components model allows to control margins of 
error for every country’s measurement. The margin of error is very useful information because it would make it more 
accurate.  
It is unanimously acknowledged that perception matters in corruption. Moreover everyone also acknowledges that 
perception is not enough. Real data about actual corruption is a permanent demand from actors involved in corruption 
and governance issues. The availability, however, of such information is extremely scarce, or simply nonexistent. The 
correlation for the WGI and the CPI is an extremely high 0.98 (Donchev, 2007). 
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Research and Methodology 
Objective of Study 
The present paper attempts to assess the interrelationship between the CPI and the principal components of 
governance indicators like Control of Corruption (CC), regulatory quality (RL) rule of law, regulatory quality (RQ) 
and government effectiveness (GE) 
Data Source and Methodology  
We have collected time series annual data on principal components of governance indicators such as CC, RL, RQ and 
GE of the selected eleven countries from the year of 1996 to 2012 from World Bank data set. The indices of 
components of governance indicators vary from -2.5 to +2.5 as per World Bank’s method. The government is 
supposed to be relatively clean as index moves to +2.5 and lax governance corresponds to the value closed to -2.5. 
The selection of country is made non-randomly or as per our convenience. The countries are USA, UK, France, 
Germany, Greece, China, India, Japan, Thailand, Brazil, and South Africa. We also collected time series data on 
Corruption Perception Index (CPI) of the countries mentioned above for the period of 1996 to 2012 from the source of 
Transparency International. The value of index ranges from 0 to 10 during the time horizon of 1996 to 2012. Clean 
government takes the value which is very near to 10 whereas corrupt government-index tends to the value 0. 
Graphical method of simple line diagram against the time series data on CPI is applied for quick view for the relative 
positions of different trend lines of different nations. The correlation coefficient is enough to assess primarily the 
degree and direction of association between the variables as we get the numerical data on governance indicators of the 
selected countries. But correlation does not mean causation. Hence, Granger Causality Test is applied for investigating 
causal relationships between the variables, cause and effect to speak of by the help of following regression equations: 
 
where Yt = time series values of the variable Y at period t              
Yt-j = ………………………………………………lag t-j              
Xt = time series values of the variable X at period t                             
Xt-i = ……………………………………………….lag t-i     
 u1t, u2t = normally distributed error terms that are serially independent 
 ai = responsiveness of Yt with respect to Xt for i
th country 
 dj = …………………..Xt with respect to Yt for the i
th  country  
X variable causes Y if åai = 0 is rejected or åai ¹ 0 is accepted in equation (1) and ådj = 0 is rejected by equation 
(2). On the other hand, Y causes X when the null hypothesis of åai = 0 in equation (1) is accepted and ådj = 0 in 
equation (2) is rejected. There will be bidirectional or feedback causality between X and Y if the null hypothesis of 
åai ¹ 0 is accepted in equation (1) and ådj ¹ 0 is accepted in equation (2). 
As the data cover 17 years, we do not need to check whether all the time series are stationary or not. Linear regression 
is taken as a tool for quantification of a change in explained variables due to change in explanatory variables.  
Empirical Investigations 
Figure 1 shows the trends of CPI of our selected nations. CPI of developed nations is closer to each other at higher 
stage except Greece during 1996 to 2012 whereas developing nations reveal well distinguishably bad perception about 
corruption. Japan improved remarkably as it has uptrend. Improvement is noticed in France, but it is very insignificant 
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to speak of. The trends of USA and Germany are almost horizontal while UK has got downtrend. Downtrend of 
corruption level in Greece shows that it has tremendously increased in 2012 compared to the initial year of 1996 
which is not observed in any other developed nations selected so far. India becomes topper in terms of collecting poor 
scores of CPI values at least up to 2005, but it has got scanty uptrend over the rest of the period despite the rampant 
corruption in the public sector in particular. In contrast, UK holds first position up to 2007, and then it is falling that 
might be explained by the external shocks of massive financial crisis in USA. USA itself could not fight against 
corruption as the CPI indices are falling after 2011 in spite of its consistent trend up to 2011. The overall picture of 
developing nations sounds bad so far as CPI is concerned, corruption increases to speak of.  
 
 
Figure 1: CPI of Countries over time 
The degree of association (or correlation coefficients) (Table-1) between CPI and governance indicators and their 
signs would provide us a primary impression by which we could get a smell how overall CPI gets reflected by the 
different components of governance indicators of the selected countries.      
Table 1: Correlation Coefficients between CPI and Governance Indicators of Countries 
 
USA UK France Germany China India Japan Thailand S. Africa Brazil Greece 
CC 
0.10 0.79 0.60 -0.06 -0.47 -0.21 0.70 -0.43 0.62 0.41 0.76 
RL -
0.17 -0.35 0.55 -0.37 0.18 -0.46 0.02 -0.68 -0.30 0.28 0.72 
RQ 
0.30 0.52 0.62 -0.39 -0.20 -0.23 0.64 0.45 -0.30 0.26 0.20 
GE 
0.07 0.83 0.04 0.08 0.66 0.43 0.69 0.60 -0.12 0.55 0.60 
Note: The bold figures represent significant correlation result at least at 5% level of significance  
The positive association between CPI and CC are expected since CPI is supposed to be enhanced as corruption-
controlling institutional machineries of the respective countries become tighten or robust. As per Table-1, UK, France, 
Japan, S. Africa and Greece show positive association indicating relatively less exercise of public power for private 
gain. Incidentally, these are all developed nations while developing nation like China shows negative association 
construing the fact that CPI falls as government-infrastructure for controlling corruption becomes much tighten. The 
paradoxical result to China explains misuse of official capacities related to CC works in opposite direction in 
controlling corruption. 
Tight RL of a country, consisting of contract, courts, judiciary system as well as activities of police and enforcement 
departments, directly influence CPI of concerned country. France and Greece are the only countries revealing positive 
association that implies sound law of the land and its implementation force CPI to rise. In contrast, corruption levels 
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in India and Thailand are enhanced when RL becomes robust or stringent. Does it imply that exemptions in RL are 
required for these two countries in order to curb corruption?   
 Better RQ means market-friendly policies are in force that has a positive impact on CPI so far market-based 
economics is concerned.  The countries like UK, France, Japan and Thailand are showing expected results since there 
are positive associations between CPI and RQ.  
We are able to reach the better empirical-link between CPI and GE out of our four governance indicators. UK, China, 
India, Japan, Thailand, Brazil and Greece have got positive association between their CPI and GE. In other words, 
CPI increases as competence of bureaucracy and the quality of public service delivery are pronounced. We have done 
the causality tests in line with the Granger (1969). The results for Greece are not satisfactory so far as the signs and 
magnitudes of correlation coefficient are concerned. The values of CPI and all the four governance indicators are of 
declining trends that are not a good sign for the economy of Greece. 
We have presented the Granger Causality Test results in Table 2 and the regression results in Table 3. Since we have 
not found any causal relation for USA, Germany and Brazil, we have not produced their statistical results into the 
tables. 
Table 2: Granger Causality Test Results 
Country Hypothesis F P Remarks 
 
 
 
UK 
CPI does not cause CC 
CC does not cause CPI 
5.03468 
11.5998 
0.04289 
0.0046 
↔ 
↔  
CPI does not  Cause GE 
GE does not  Cause CPI 
 0.08504 
9.34044 
0.77518 
0.00919 
No 
→ 
France  CPI does not Cause RQ 
RQ does not Cause CPI 
0.43892 
3.97351 
0.51922 
0.06764 
No 
→ 
China  CPI does not Cause GE 
GE does not Cause CPI 
1.43289 
4.54927 
  0.25267  
0.05257 
No 
→ 
India CPI does not Cause GE 
GE does not Cause CPI 
 10.8053 
0.04903 
0.00589 
0.82820 
→ 
No 
 
 
Japan 
CPI does not Cause RQ 
RQ does not Cause CPI 
0.46481 
3.43204  
0.50735 
0.08678 
No 
→ 
CPI does not Cause GE 
GE does not Cause CPI 
0.55726 
8.4544 
 0.46865 
0.01223  
No 
→  
Thailand CPI does not Cause RL 
RL does not  Cause CPI 
1.18994 
4.66455 
0.29515 
0.05006 
No 
→  
S. Africa  CPI does not  Cause CC 
CC does not  Cause CPI 
0.02830 
3.07490 
0.86898 
0.10304 
No 
→  
 
 
Greece  
CPI does not  Cause CC 
CC does not Cause CPI 
 9.36353 
0.49042  
 0.00912 
0.49608 
→  
No 
CPI does not Cause GE 
GE does not Cause CPI 
 2.17818 
3.66782 
 0.16379 
0.07773  
No 
→  
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Table 3: Regression Results 
Country Dependent Variable Independent Variable Intercept Slope R2 
 
 
UK 
CPI CC 5.19 
(8.4) 
1.59 
(5.01) 
0.62 
CC CPI -1.32 
(-2.04) 
0.39 
(5.00) 
0.63 
CPI GE   2.9 
( 3.31 ) 
3 
(5.81 ) 
0.70 
France CPI RQ 5.50 
(  14.53  ) 
1.10 
( 3.12  ) 
0.39 
China  CPI  GE  3.14 
(  68.94  ) 
1.47 
(  3.40 ) 
0.44 
India  CPI GE  3.41 
(38.68) 
0.25 
( 0.25) 
0.004 
 
 
Japan 
CPI RQ  5.74 
(13.46) 
1.48 
(3.26) 
0.41 
CPI GE  4.48 
(6.39) 
2.03 
(3.75) 
0.48 
Thailand CPI RL  3.45 
(74.48) 
-0.49 
(-3.64) 
0.46 
S. Africa CPI CC  4.44 
(33.61) 
0.91 
(3.13) 
0.40 
 
Greece 
CC  CPI  -1.86  
(-3.79) 
0.51 
( 4.58) 
0.58 
GE  CPI 2.67 
(4.53) 
2.55 
(2.92) 
0.37 
        Note: The parentheses indicate student’s t values.  
A bilateral causal link between CPI and CC is noticed in UK, index-value of CC increases by 1.59 units as CPI 
increases by one unit and CPI rises by 0.39 units as CC rises by one unit, and hence it has a multiplier effect so far as 
reduction in corruption is concerned in UK. GE causes strongly to the reduction of corruption in UK. In France, RQ is 
observed to be a most powerful indicator in reducing corruption whereas it is second most powerful indicator after GE 
in reducing of corruption in Japan. Governance indicator like GE plays an important role to push down the corruption 
in Japan. In China and India, GE is proactive as well as influencing indicator to curb corruption. The inverse 
relationship between RL and CPI in Thailand indicates that ongoing machineries related to RL is not complementary 
to the reduction of corruption; perhaps increase in state expenditure on corrupt judiciary system bracketed with 
corrupt enforcement officials become ineffective in pushing down the corruption level. The state machineries of CC in 
S. Africa are highly relevant to reduce the volume of corruption. In Greece, the variations of CPI positively influence 
the variations of CC and the indicator like GE is effective in controlling corruption as reflected by CPI.  
Conclusion 
All the governance-indicators selected so far have failed to arrest their state level corruptions in USA, Germany and 
Brazil.  Some of the  indicators, as per our study, influnene the values of CPI for the remaining countries. For 
example, a bilateral positive causal link between CPI and CC in UK shows a splendid result in curbing corruption as it 
has a multiplier effect too. In the developing nations, China, India, and S. Africa, GE and CC are the only effective 
indicators to abate corruption whereas in Thailand corruption increases as RL becomes tighten; perhaps caused by 
lack of reforms in judiciary and enforcement department in particular. In Japan, RQ and GE are effective indicators 
whereas only GE is effective component in Greece for the abatement of corruption. Epilogue suggests that 
performance of some of the indicators works well in controlling corruption in some nations; even some indicators 
work in negative directions in some nations. Probably radical reforms should be supplementary to the governance to 
be more vibrant for people’s interest that saves state resources which could be allocated to national interest.   
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